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THE COST OF TIME: HAPHAZARD DISCOUNTING
AND THE UNDERVALUATION OF
REGULATORY BENEFITS
Arden Rowell*
When performing cost-benefit analyses, regulators typically use willing-
ness-to-pay studies to determine how much to spend to avert risks. Because
money has a time-value, when a risk is valued is inextricable from how much
it is valued. Unfortunately, the studies on which regulators rely are insensi-
tive to this fact: they elicit people's willingness to pay for risk reductions with-
out identifying the time at which the risk reduction will occur. Relying on
these time-indeterminate studies has led to a systematic skew in regulatory
cost-benefit analysis, toward the undervaluation of risks to human lives.
Insofar as cost-benefit analyses inform regulation, this suggests that the cur-
rent system systematically under regulates against risks to health and safety.
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INTRODUCTION
To perform cost-benefit analyses, regulators often trade off imme-
diate costs with benefits that will not accrue until some future time.
How this trade-off is performed has important implications, particu-
larly where-as with climate change, nuclear power, and the preserva-
tion of endangered species-most of the benefits of a regulatory
action will be enjoyed by the future.
How do regulators value risks to the future? At first glance, much
the way they value immediate risks: they rely on studies that measure
people's willingness to pay for a risk reduction and assume that those
preferences are constant across contexts. If study participants are, on
average, willing to pay $80 to ameliorate a risk of 1-in-100,000 of dying
from cancer, regulators assume that preventing a single cancer death
will justify an expenditure of $8 million.'
But an expenditure of $8 million . . . when? If the cancer death
will not occur until twenty years from now, regulators assume that it
will be appropriate to spend $8 million to prevent the death in twenty
years. To determine how much to spend today to reduce the future
(or "latent") risk, regulators "discount" the value of the risk reduction
to modern-day dollars. They do this on the assumption that money
has a time-value: a dollar today is worth less than a dollar twenty years
from now, because money can be invested and made to grow. The
I When these calculations are used to monetize mortality risks, they are often
referred to as finding the "value of a statistical life" (VSL). The term is somewhat
misleading, as the "value of a statistical life" reflects neither the amount any single
person would pay to save a life nor the amount any group of people would pay to save
a single life. It is merely the aggregated amount of people's valuations of (typically
very small) statistical risks. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72
U. CHI. L. REV. 537, 560 (2005) (noting the unfortunate pervasiveness of the term
"valuation of statistical lives," and proposing "valuation of statistical mortality risks" as
a less misleading alternative).
[VOL. 85-41506
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effect of discounting is marked: at a 7% discount rate-a rate cur-
rently recommended by the Office of Management and Budget 2-reg-
ulators would be willing to spend only $2 million today to prevent the
future cancer death.
This approach is highly controversial.3 For the purposes of this
Article, however, I take current practice on its own terms4 and make a
basic internal point. The point is this: study participants may discount
too.
2 The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is responsible for coordinating
and reviewing regulatory analyses. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 640
(1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006). OMB currently recommends that regula-
tors use a 7% discount rate as a default and that they prepare analyses with both 3%
and 7% discount rates. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESI-
DENT, CIRCULAR A-4 ON REGULATORY ANALYSIS 33-34 (2003) [hereinafter OMB CIRcu-
LAR A-4]. These rates have yet to be reviewed by the Obama administration. Post-
2008 market conditions may well lead to a lower default rate, as the discount rate is
primarily a measure of opportunity for economic investment.
3 Because discounting implicates difficult legal, political, philosophical, and eco-
nomic concerns, the controversy arrives on many fronts. For objections to the project
of monetization, see Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless. Cost-
Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1553, 1562-63 (2002).
For objections to aggregating economic preferences to guide political decisionmak-
ing, see ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 190-216 (1993);
AMARTYA SEN, RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM 286-88 (2002). For a discussion of the nega-
tive distributional implications of relying solely on willingness to pay, see Cass R. Sun-
stein, Valuing Life: A Plea for Disaggregation, 54 DUKE L.J. 385, 422-39 (2004). For a
discussion of the appropriate discount rate, see DISCOUNTING AND INTERGENERATIONAL
EQunY (Paul R. Portney &John P. Weyant eds., 1999); RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTRO-
PHE 150-55 (2004); William J. Baumol, On the Social Rate of Discount, 58 Am. ECON.
REv. 788, 793-96 (1968); Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of
the Future: Discount Rates, Later Generations, and the Environment, 46 VAND. L. REv. 267,
279-89 (1993). For a useful overview of alternatives to preference-based accounts of
welfare, see MATTHEw D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENE-
FIT ANALYSIS 28-35 (2006) (discussing mental-state, objective-good, and preference-
based accounts). For a discussion of various framing and data effects that affect cur-
rent VSL measurements, see generally W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a
Statistical Life: A Critical Review of Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 5 (2003) (considering a variety of factors, including unionization,
income, and age).
4 That is, I assume that it is appropriate to manage at least some risks through
the regulatory system; that cost-benefit analysis and monetization are helpful
processes; that people's willingness-to-pay for goods-such as risk reduction-should
inform policy; and that future regulatory benefits should-once monetized-be dis-
counted at the market rate, just like any other money. In previous work, I have
offered a partial defense of these assumptions. See Cass R. Sunstein & Arden Rowell,
On Discounting Regulatory Benefits: Risk, Money, and Intergenerational Equity, 74 U. CHI. L.
REv. 171, 181-86 (2007). For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see infra Part
I.
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This point will turn out to be very inconvenient for regulators.
To see why, consider the example above. The initial study found that,
on average, people were willing to spend $80 to ameliorate a cancer
mortality risk of 1-in-100,000. Regulators used this figure to calculate
both the amount they would spend now to prevent a single cancer
death today ($8 million) and the amount they would spend now to
prevent a single cancer death in twenty years ($2 million). To avert
the risk of one hundred cancer deaths in twenty years, then, regula-
tors would be willing to spend $200 million today.
But if participants in the study gave their initial valuations on the
assumption that the cancer death would come (if it did come) not
today, but at some time in the future-then these numbers are com-
pletely wrong. In that case, the $80 figure was the participants' cur-
rent valuation of the future risk-which means that it was already
discounted by study participants.5 If study participants made the same
assumptions as the regulators-if they assumed that it would be twenty
years until they might die from the cancer risk they faced, and if they
applied a 7% rate,6 then the underlying valuation of the harm is not
$80, it is $310-the amount you get if you invest $80 at a 7% return
over twenty years. This means that, to prevent one immediate death
from cancer, regulators should be spending not $8 million, but $31
million. And if $31 million is the correct underlying figure, then reg-
ulators should be spending $8 million today per cancer death avoided
in twenty years-quadruple the amount they would spend under the
current system.
5 Behavioral evidence suggests that people do discount future events and at posi-
tive rates. See, e.g., Anna Alberini et al., Willingness to Pay for Mortality Risk Reductions:
Does Latency Matter?, 32 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 231, 243 (2006) (finding that delaying
the time at which the risk reduction occurs by ten to thirty years decreases the willing-
ness to pay for reduced mortality risk by more than half for respondents forty to sixty
years old). But even if study participants did not discount-or more formally, dis-
counted at a 0% rate-it would be inappropriate for regulators to discount their valu-
ations, as present values should not be discounted.
6 For simplicity's sake, this example spells out what would happen if people dis-
counted like regulators do-if they applied a single, flat discount rate over time.
There is robust behavioral evidence that people's actual discounting behavior is not
this consistent: people in fact exhibit what is called "hyperbolic discounting," mean-
ing that they place a very high premium on goods they get immediately, and apply a
steeply declining discount rate thereafter. See Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting
and Time Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J. ECON. LrERATURE 351, 360-62 (2002) (sum-
marizing evidence of hyperbolic discounting). To the extent that people do discount
hyperbolically, the effect I am identifying is significantly magnified, because even a
very small amount of perceived latency would lead to very large devaluation.
1508 [VOL. 85-4
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This is a relatively conservative estimate of how much double dis-
counting could affect analyses, because it assumes a relatively short
latency period. As the latency period increases, the effect of any
double discounting increases as well. If both study participants and
regulators assumed a forty-year latency period and applied a 7% dis-
count rate, regulators would spend only 1/15 of what they ought to
spend, as measured against what people would actually be willing to
spend for the future benefit. And at a one-hundred-year latency, such
as could exist for longer term issues like global warming, regulators
would be valuing future benefits at less than 1/800 of their actual
value.7
What does this mean for regulators? It means that, to the extent
that any willingness-to-pay study participants have perceived any
latency in any of the risks they have valued over the past thirty-odd
years-and as I discuss in more detail below, this describes many of
the studies that regulators rely upon-regulatory cost-benefit analysis
systematically undervalues risk reductions. And where regulators dis-
count future risks, they are rediscounting already-discounted valua-
tions. To the extent that cost-benefit analysis affects regulatory policy,
this means that regulatory policy is systematically (albeit inadver-
tently) underprotective against risks to public health and safety.
So that is the basic concern of this Article: regulatory analyses
systematically undervalue the benefits of regulation. Practical readers
will note that there is a seemingly straightforward solution to this
issue: if this problem arises from time-indeterminate studies, then it
can be solved by using better studies, ones which identify the time at
which risks are being valued. And indeed, this is my initial recom-
mendation: that regulators use time-explicit monetization studies.
Unfortunately, the choice of how to make monetization studies time-
explicit turns out to be highly normatively charged, and requires a
sophisticated and necessarily controversial account of intertemporal
7 If study participants assumed that there was a forty-year latency and applied a
7% discount rate, they would be willing to spend only $534,000 to secure an $8 mil-
lion benefit in forty years; if regulators assumed a forty-year latency period as well,
they would be willing to spend only $35,676.95 today to prevent the future risk-
about 1/15 what they should be spending. If study participants assumed that there
was a one-hundred-year latency between when they were making a payment and when
the benefit would accrue-a period that might be reasonable for long term issues
such as global warming, nuclear waste disposal, or the existence of species-then at a
7% discount rate, they would be willing to pay $9,219.60 today to gain the future
benefit. If regulators discounted this figure over one hundred years at 7% again, they
would end up spending only $10.63 for the benefit. That would be 1/867 or 1/10%
of what they should be spending, as measured against what people would actually be
willing to pay today for the future benefit.
2010] 1509
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choice. I do not attempt to develop that account here. I merely out-
line two defensible approaches to valuing future risk, and argue that
either would be a significant improvement over current practice. Fur-
ther recommendations will be addressed in future work.
This Article is primarily concerned with drawing the outline of
the problem. Accordingly, it starts in Part I with an orientation into
the application of economic cost-benefit analysis to regulatory risks.
Readers who are already familiar with debates about discounting and
monetization may wish to skip to Part II, where I begin my analysis of
how agencies value risks across time. That Part focuses particularly on
the studies and methods used by the Environmental Protection
Agency. It concludes that current practice undermines much of the
value of monetizing risk reductions, because it inadvertently
introduces a systemic downward bias into the valuation of the benefits
of regulation. Part III outlines a (partial) solution for remedying this
bias and flags additional concerns in selecting a methodology for mea-
suring risks across time. Part IV addresses potential objections and
Part V identifies some additional implications of time-indeterminacy
in other contexts.
I. TIME, MONEY, AND RISK: AN ORIENTATION
The analysis that I undertake in Part II is based upon a number of
assumptions about time, money, and risk.
This Part seeks to explicate some of these assumptions. It pro-
ceeds in three sections. The first looks at the relationship between
risk and money, and explains why this Article assumes that monetizing
risk is helpful to regulatory policy. The second addresses the relation-
ship between time and money. It describes the time-value of money
and explains why future monetary amounts must be discounted
before they can be meaningfully compared to present-day monetary
amounts. The third identifies how the relationship between risk and
time operates with money as an intermediary. It explains why this
Article assumes that future monetized risks must be discounted just
like money.
A. Risk and Money
Economists generally assume that regulatory benefits-such as
increased safety against risks to life and health-can be dealt with just
like money.8 But monetization remains controversial, particularly
8 SeeJohn J. Donohue III, Why We Should Discount the Views of Those Who Discount
Discounting, 108 YALE L.J. 1901, 1904-06 (1999); Robert W. Hahn, The Economic Analy-
[VOL. 85:41510
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among those who are concerned that money cannot accurately
represent the worth of nonmonetary goods.9 The more we are con-
cerned that money does not capture the entire "worth" of a good, the
less helpful we will find economic cost-benefit analyses, as these analy-
ses will portray less and less of the total worth of the goods being
compared.
But even if we think that money is a deeply incomplete measure
of some goods, monetized valuations are still useful as informational
floors, particularly where money will be spent to secure the good in
question. A person considering whether or not to adopt a second
child might want to know that she is likely to spend at least $10,930
per year on child-rearing costs.10 If she chose to adopt the child
under those circumstances, an observer might reasonably conclude
that, at the time of her decision, she was willing to pay at least $10,930
a year to add the child to her family. Of course it is possible-even
likely-that she is willing to "pay" far more, in both money and other
goods (for example, emotional investment). And other people
(grandparents, friends, the state, the child himself) might be willing
to pay additional amounts of various goods for the adoption to take
place. But none of that suggests that it is incorrect to speak of the
mother as willing to pay (at least) $10,930 a year to adopt the child or
that it is any less helpful for the mother to know the expected mone-
tary cost before she commits to the adoption.
The same methodology applies to the valuation of risks. If peo-
ple are willing to spend $50 to reduce their risk of dying tomorrow in
an automobile crash by 1 in 100,000, then policymakers can take that
as evidence that reducing that risk is worth at least $50. Reducing the
risk may, of course, be worth far more than that in emotional cost, for
example. And it might be worth significantly more than that even in
dollars if policymakers include the preferences of the study partici-
pants' families," or if the study was structured to capture minimum
sis of Regulation: A Response to the Critics, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 1021, 1026-27 (2004). For
various economic perspectives on the issue, see generally DiscOuNTING AND
INTERGENERATIONAL Equrw, supra note 3 (offering essays of renowned economists on
the use of discounting).
9 See, e.g., Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 3, at 1564-65 (arguing that
human life "is not a commodity and does not have a price").
10 The U.S. Department of Agriculture estimates that a two-parent family with a
"middle" income (between $45,800 and $77,100 combined) spends between $10,930
and $12,030 on each child. See CTR. FOR NUTRION PoucY & PROMOTION, U.S. DEP'T
OF AGRIc., EXPENDITURES ON CHILDREN BY FAMILIEs 7 (2007), available at http://www.
cnpp.usda.gov/Publications/CRC/crc2007.pdf.
11 Some stated preference studies do elicit people's willingness to pay both for
themselves and their families. See, e.g., TED MILLER &JAGADISH GURIA, THE VALUE OF
2010] 1511
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willingness-to-pay rather than maximum willingness-to-pay.' 2 But even
where willingness-to-pay studies only provide a minimum valuation,
they are still useful to inform policy decisions.
B. Time and Money
Money has a time-value-a dollar today is worth more than a dol-
lar next year-so monetary amounts that accrue at different times
must be adjusted before they can be compared to one another. When
future monetary values are adjusted to their present value, the process
is called "discounting."
Much of the time-value of money comes from the possibility of
investment: in any functioning economy, money can be put to use and
made to grow.' 3 People also exhibit "pure time preference" for
money, meaning that-even without investment opportunities-peo-
ple prefer to receive a dollar now than a dollar in twenty years.' 4
The rate at which money is predicted to gain value determines
the economic discount rate.' 5 Predicting the future value of money is
a chancy enterprise, as it requires the prediction of return on invest-
STATISTICAL LIFE IN NEW ZEALAND 4-5, 25-26 (1991) (determining the value of a sta-
tistical life based upon household willingness to pay and finding that 35% of respon-
dents were also willing to pay some amount to benefit the general public). Whether
or not to include so called "disinterested preferences" into cost-benefit analysis
remains a debated topic. For an argument that agencies should disregard non-self-
regarding preferences, see ADLER & POSNER, supra note 3, at 133-36.
12 Or if the study were structured to elicit willingness-to-accept instead of willing-
ness-to-pay. Willingness-to-accept studies routinely elicit far higher numbers than will-
ingness-to-pay numbers. For a review of the empirical literature comparing the two
methods, see John K. Horowitz & Kenneth E. McConnell, A Review of WTA/WFP Stud-
ies, 44J. ENvrL. ECON. & MGMT. 426, 435-40 (2002). For an argument that regulatory
cost-benefit analyses should be adjusted in response to the disparity between the two
types of studies, see Jack L. Knetsch, Environmental Policy Implications of Disparities
Between Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded Measures of Values, 18 J. ENVTL.
ECoN. & MGMT. 227, 230 (1990).
13 For a very helpful overview, see generally Geoffrey Heal, Discounting: A Review
of the Basic Economics, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 59 (2007).
14 For a discussion of "pure time preference," see Richard L. Revesz, Environmen-
tal Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L.
REv. 941, 997-1002 (1999) (arguing that pure time preference has different implica-
tions for intra- and inter-generational discounting). For an argument that pure time
preference is irrational, see Tyler Cowen & Derek Parfit, Against the Social Discount
Rate, in JUSTICE BETWEEN AGE GROUPS AND GENERATIONS 144, 155 (Peter Laslett &
James S. Fishkin eds., 1992).
15 I speak only of the discount rate for money-also described variously as the
market discount rate, the descriptive discount rate, and the economic discount rate.
There is significant debate about whether this rate should be applied to non-mone-
tary goods-as to whether there should be a "social discount rate." For an overview of
[VOL. 85:41512
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ment, among other factors.16 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the choice of
the appropriate discount rate remains quite controversial.1 7
The choice of a discount rate is made no easier by the scale of the
stakes involved. Frequently, the choice of discount rate will be solely
responsible for determining whether a regulation looks to be cost-jus-
tified.18 That is because discounting is the flipside of compound
interest.
As you may recall from high school math, compounding interest
adds up quickly. Consider the classic example of the "penny doubling
game," where the player starts with a series of boxes in front of him:
the first with one penny in it, the second with two, the third with four,
the fourth with eight, and so on. The effect of compounding is such
that the sixty-fourth box would have to contain more than the entire
world's wealth.19
Discounting works the same way, but in reverse. If we knew the
discount rate (i.e., the rate of increase) and the total amount of
money in the sixty-fourth box, we could discount to determine the
amount of money in the first box, the second, or the forty-third.
Economists continue to argue about the appropriate discount
rate.20 But there is a general consensus that money has a time-value,
this controversy and an argument that the market rate should apply once regulatory
goods have been monetized, see Sunstein & Rowell, supra note 4, at 181-86.
16 See OMB CIRcuLAR A-4, supra note 2, at 33 (recommending the "shadow price"
approach to discounting, and suggesting that "any agency that wishes to tackle this
challenging analytical task should check with OMB before proceeding"); see also Heal,
supra note 13, at 77 (suggesting the valuing of investment changes by the shadow
price of capital as a reflection of the contribution extra capital makes to
consumption).
17 For a discussion of the disagreement among economists as to what the market
discount rate should be and a proposal as to how the disagreement might be resolved,
see Martin L. Weitzman, Gamma Discounting, 91 Am. ECON. REv. 260, 266-69 (2001).
For a discussion of the inter-field controversies surrounding the choice of a discount
rate, see David Weisbach & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change and Discounting the Future:
A Guide for the Perplexed, 27 YALE L. & POL'v REv. 433, 441-49 (2009).
18 For an argument that the choice of discount rate alone will determine the
majority of climate change policy during our lifetimes, see Weisbach & Sunstein,
supra note 17, at 440-41. For a useful economic primer on discounting, see Heal,
supra note 13, at 67-68.
19 See Martin L. Weitzman, "Just Keep Discounting, but...", in Discounting and
Intergenerational Equity, supra note 3, at 23, 28. In 2008, the global GDP was approx-
imately $61 trillion, or $6.1 x 10". See THE WORLD BANK, GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
2008 (2009), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/
Resources/GDP.pdf.
20 See Weitzman, supra note 17, at 261.
2010] 1513
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and that future money must therefore be discounted at some rate
before it can be compared to current-day money.
While there is a general consensus that it is appropriate to dis-
count money, numerous commentators have questioned whether dis-
counting is appropriate when it is lives or health that are at risk
instead.2 1 This uneasy intuition has led several analysts to conclude
that, when regulators face risks to health or human safety, they should
refuse to discount altogether.22
The question of whether goods should be valued differently at
different times is indeed a vexing one. But the debate, which has cen-
tered around the process of discounting, misses a simple point. The
monetary "value" of regulatory benefits is calculated based on peo-
ple's willingness to pay to secure those benefits.23 When regulators
discount the value of those benefits, they are discounting money that
people want to use to protect life or health-not life or health as
such. 24
So long as regulatory policy relies on willingness to pay, regula-
tors must discount future benefits-including future risk reductions-
to their present value, just as they would with any other money.25
Monetized valuations of nonmonetary benefits can provide
policymakers with a baseline for setting policy, particularly when pol-
icy determinations will be paid for with money. Part of maintaining
the accuracy of monetization studies is respecting the metric in which
they measure valuations. Money has certain characteristics-among
them, time-value-and monetized valuations of risk have the same
characteristics.
21 See Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 3, at 1571 (noting that when long
time spans are involved, discounting at any positive rate makes even global catastro-
phes seem trivial); Cowen & Parfit, supra note 14, at 145; Paul R. Portney & John P.
Weyant, Introduction to DISCOUNTING AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQuriy, supra note 3, at
1, 5 (describing "the unease even the best minds of the profession feel about dis-
counting, due to the technical complexity of the issues and to their ethical ramifica-
tions"); Revesz, supra note 14, at 1008-09.
22 See Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Life, 108 YALE L.J. 1911, 1913 (1999) (arguing
that lives should not be subject to discounting because they do not "compound the
way money does"); Revesz, supra note 14, at 987-1007 (suggesting that discounting
harms to future generations over a long period of time likely produces a negligible
present discounted value).
23 See Sunstein & Rowell, supra note 4, at 181-82.
24 See id. at 183.
25 See id. at 185.
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C. Risk and Time
To see how the time-value of money interacts with the monetiza-
tion of risk, suppose that people in general are willing to pay $8 mil-
lion in today's dollars to save a life today. If regulators do not
discount, a life saved one hundred years from now would justify the
same expenditure: $8 million. If regulators discount at a 10% dis-
count rate,26 saving the same life would justify a modern expenditure
of only $581.27 Even at a lower discount rate of 5%, saving one hun-
dred lives in one hundred years would justify an expenditure of only
$6.25 million today28-versus $800 million without discounting. That
means that, under traditional cost-benefit techniques, we would spend
less to save one hundred lives in one hundred years than we would
spend to save a single life today.
Critics of discounting point to numbers like these as evidence
that discounting produces troubling results, 29 while defenders of dis-
counting point to equally perverse outcomes from refusing to dis-
count.30 But the striking effect of discounting is not a good reason to
either use or refuse it as a tool. Just as compound interest makes
26 The OMB recommended a 10% discount rate during the 1980s. See Donohue,
supra note 8, at 1906 n.26. More recently, it has switched to suggesting that agencies
prepare analyses using rates of both 3% and 7%. For the 7% rate, see Benefit-Cost
Analysis of Federal Programs; Guidelines and Discounts, 57 Fed. Reg. 53,519,
53,522-23 (Nov. 10, 1992). For a more recent suggestion that agencies use both 3%
and 7%, see OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 2, at 33-34. All of these numbers remain
controversial. See Richard W. Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1345,
1373-75 (2003).
27 See Michael B. Gerrard, Demons and Angels in Hazardous Waste Regulation: Are
justice, Efficiency, and Democracy Reconcilable?, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 706, 742-43 (1998).
28 See Sunstein & Rowell, supra note 4, at 172.
29 See, e.g., Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 3, at 1571 (finding that with "a
discount rate of 5%, for example, the death of a billion people 500 years from now
becomes less serious than the death of one person today," and arguing that "[s]een in
this way, discounting looks like a fancy justification for foisting our problems off onto
the people who come after us"); Cowen & Parfit, supra note 14, at 145 ("Imagine
finding out that you, having just reached your twenty-first birthday, must soon die of
cancer because one evening Cleopatra wanted an extra helping of dessert.").
30 See, e.g., DAVID W. PEARCE & R. KERRY TURNER, ECONOMICS OF NATURAL
RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT 223-24 (1990) (arguing that a negative discount
rate leaves all generations in subsistence with consumption postponed until
tomorrow); Dexter Samida & David A. Weisbach, Paretian Intergenerational Discounting,
74 U. CHI. L. REV. 145, 169-70 (2007) (noting that "[b]ecause of the power of dis-
counting it is easy to come up with rhetorical quips that make discounting seem unat-
tractive," and responding to Cowen and Parfit's Cleopatra example, see supra note 29,
with the claim that "every time you eat a banana, you condemn a million people in
the future to death").
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retirement funds grow large, so discounting makes future benefits
look small in today's dollars. We do not refuse to invest in retirement
funds on the grounds that projected growth-at least of investments
made at a young age-results in an outlandishly large figure. Refus-
ing to discount on these grounds makes as little sense.
Refusing to discount these monetary amounts can even be mis-
leading. If economic cost-benefit analysis has a claim to usefulness, it
is because it converts disparate goods into a single metric: money.
Money can be invested. This is one of its fundamental qualities. The
practice of discounting monetized benefits stems from this quality:
removing that characteristic from the mix means that we are no
longer dealing with money. Instead, we are comparing classic soda to
diet soda-"money" to something like "money lite," which has some
(but not all) of the qualities of money.
And so long as regulators purport to perform economic cost-ben-
efit analyses-analyses expressed in monetary terms-it would be mis-
leading for them to compare money (which has the qualities of
fungibility and time-value) with "money lite" (which has neither, or
has them only occasionally). It is similarly misleading to act as if will-
ingness-to-pay studies-which measure people's willingness to pay
money for particular goods-can tell us how much "money lite" peo-
ple would pay for similar goods.
This is not to say that money is always the best metric for measur-
ing everything.3' We may have reasonable concerns that exchanging
money for some goods creates a dignitary harm; that the amount of
money people are willing to pay for a good is limited by their existing
wealth, which is a function of inequitable allocations of resources; or
that some goods-such as those not commonly traded on the market,
or which are wrapped up with identity or other disaggregable quali-
ties-can only be "monetized" so inaccurately that it is not worth the
trouble.
But if money is not the right metric for valuing all regulatory
goods, the solution is not to pretend that we are still using money
even as we subversively introduce "money lite" into the mix. The solu-
tion is to find a new metric or to use monetized values as a minimum
for regulatory action, rather than a maximum. So long as we do use
money as the metric for regulatory analyses, we must discount future
monetary amounts before we compare those amounts to present-day
dollars. This is not for any peculiar or controversial reason-it is sim-
31 Cf MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HuMAN DEVELOPMENT 34-110 (2000)
(arguing that there are diverse objective goods that represent different dimensions of
human welfare).
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ply because discounting follows from time-value, which is a basic attri-
bute of money.
So regulators should discount future monetary amounts before
they compare them to present monetary amounts. It is true that dis-
counting has a massive effect on how much we spend today to secure
future goods, like reductions in mortality risks. But while the
extraordinary effect of positive discount rates should not dissuade reg-
ulators from discounting where appropriate, it should make them
extremely hesitant to discount haphazardly.
II. MONETIZATION AND TIME-INDETERMINACY:
PROBLEMS WITH PRACTICE
This Part proceeds in three sections. It begins with an overview of
the reasons why regulators monetize risks, and the legal and political
decisionmaking structures that promote and support the monetiza-
tion of risk. It then analyzes studies that the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA)-often regarded as one of the more economically
savvy agencies-uses to set the baseline "value of a statistical life" for
environmental regulations. A review of the studies leads to the con-
clusion that it would be highly implausible to think that the willing-
ness-to-pay numbers elicited in these studies reflect willingness-to-pay
to avert immediate risks. It concludes by discussing the policy implica-
tions of study time-indeterminacy.
A. Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis in Practice
Most people proceed through their days quite happily without
worrying about tiny risks. But for administrative agencies, the con-
cerns are different. For risks of 1-in-100,000, we individually have only
a .001% chance of being affected. But where there is a 1-in-100,000
risk spread across a population of three hundred million people,
3,000 people will probably be affected. 32
There are countless such risks, and resources must be spent on
larger risks as well. A dollar spent one place cannot be spent else-
where, so agencies must allocate scarce resources. This requires some
method of prioritizing amongst risks.33
32 As a point of comparison, the September 11th attacks killed about this many
people. See BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, NATIONAL CENSUS OF
FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES IN 2001, at 7 tbl.A (2002), available at http://www.bls.
gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cfnrOO08.pdf (reporting that 2886 workers died in the events of
the day).
33 The pervasiveness of risk is a constant in risk analysis. For various perspectives,
see RISK VERSUS RISK John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995).
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The prevailing approach in the United States is to rely on trade-
off analyses, primarily cost-benefit analysis.3 4 Indeed, under Executive
Order 12,866, agencies are required to evaluate alternative strategies
for all economically significant regulations.35 As part of that evalua-
tion, agencies must analyze the expected costs and benefits of the pro-
posed regulation.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is the gatekeeper
for federal regulatory decisionmaking. In particular, it is responsible
for coordinating and reviewing regulatory analyses.3 6 OMB provides
agencies with written guidance on preferred practices for implement-
ing regulatory analyses in its Circular A4.3 7 The exact nature of this
document is somewhat disputed,3 8 but as a functional matter, agen-
cies must receive a pass from OMB before they can promulgate major
regulations.
OMB then issues a report to Congress on the costs and benefits of
federal regulation.39 The report must include an estimate of the total
annual benefits and costs of each "major rule."4 0 The report offers a
summary of the costs and benefits of all federal regulations promul-
gated in the previous ten years, as well as individual estimates for each
34 This focus is not inevitable. For a comparison of United States and European
practices, see David Vogel, The Politics of Risk Regulation in Europe and the United States,
in 3 THE YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1, 7-14 (H. Somsen ed., 2003).
35 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 640 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(2006). Only clear statutory prohibition bars agencies from performing cost-benefit
analysis. Cf Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498, 1508 (2009) (holding
that EPA appropriately applied cost-benefit analysis to a provision of the Safe Drink-
ing Water Act, on the grounds that use of cost-benefit analysis had not been expressly
prohibited). President Obama has indicated that he is reviewing Executive Order
12,866. See Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed.
Reg. 5977 (Jan. 30, 2009).
36 See 3 C.F.R. 640. For a discussion of OMB's role in regulatory decisionmaking,
see Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation,
70 U. CHI. L. REv. 821, 824-30 (2003).
37 OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 2, at 9-11, 33-34.
38 See Lisa A. Robinson, How US Government Agencies Value Mortality Risk Reductions,
1 REv. ENvrTL. ECON. & PoL'v. 283, 286 (2007) (noting that "OMB treats some of the
guidance as mandatory," but concluding that "[u] ltimately, each individual regulatory
analysis is the result of negotiations between the OMB and the agency").
39 The yearly report is required under the Regulatory Right-to-Know Act, 31
U.S.C. § 1105 (2006).
40 "Major rules" include all regulations with an annual effect on the economy of
$100 million or more. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESI-
DENT, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATION AND
UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIEs 2 (2008), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/informationandregulatory.affairs/2008_
cb-final.pdf.
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major rule promulgated during the year. 4 1 The amounts of money
involved are enormous: between October 1997 and September 2007,
OMB estimates that the quantifiable benefits of federal regulation
were between $122 billion and $656 billion, and that the quantifiable
costs were between $46 and $54 billion. 4 2
Where do these dollar amounts come from? OMB's preferred
methodologies for monetizing risk are presented in its Circular A-4,
which provides recommendations as to how agencies should value the
expected benefits from proposed regulations. 43 In valuing reduced
mortality risks, OMB recommends that agencies present valuations for
lives saved.4 4 The Circular cites to academic literature on the valua-
tion of mortality risk reduction, and concludes that "[a] substantial
majority of the resulting estimates of VSL vary from roughly $1 million
to $10 million per statistical life."45 When submitting proposals to
OMB, agencies typically use values within this range. 4 6
OMB has emphasized-both in Circular A-4 and in other gui-
dance-the importance of study quality and fit.4 7 Yet no OMB gui-
dance deals with the timing of valuations. OMB Circular A-4 does
41 See id.
42 See id. at iii.
43 See OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 2, at 39-42.
44 Id. at 12. The Circular also recommends that agencies provide valuations for
life-years saved (VSLY). Id. Note that, due to the controversy surrounding the VSLY-
related "senior death discount," EPA is prohibited from using life-years in its analyses.
See Robinson, supra note 38, at 287; see also Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat. 3, 419. OMB is aware of the controversy surrounding
these valuations and encourages agencies to explicitly identify any drawbacks of their
chosen approach(es). See OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 2, at 13-14. The FDA con-
tinues to use life-year estimates in calculating the monetized value of nonfatal health
conditions. See, e.g., Food Labeling: Trans Fatty Acids in Nutrition Labeling, Nutri-
tion Content Claims, and Health Claims, 68 Fed. Reg. 41,433, 41,488 (July 11, 2003).
45 OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 2, at 30. For these numbers, the Circular cites
two meta-analyses of existing studies: Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 3, at 37, andJanusz R.
Mrozek & Laura 0. Taylor, What Determines the Value of Life? A Meta-Analysis, 21 J.
POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 253, 258 (2002). Circular A-4 does not attach a dollar year to
the figures, but it was issued in 2003.
46 See Robinson, supra note 38, at 286. Occasionally agencies provide estimates
for the entire suggested range. See, e.g., Mine Safety & Health Admin., U.S. Dep't of
Labor, Regulatory Economic Analysis for Refuge Alternatives 9 (2008), available at
http://www.msha.gov/regs/rea/refuge-alternatives.pdf (calculating the net cost of
the rulemaking at a $1 million VSL and a $10 million VSL "purely for informational
purposes").
47 See OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 2, at 17; Memorandum from Joshua B. Bol-
ton, Director, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, to Heads of
Dep't and Agencies 2 (Dec. 16, 2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
assets/omb/memoranda/fy2005/m05-03.pdf.
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provide detailed guidance to regulators seeking to evaluate (or per-
form) stated preference studies, but nowhere among the nine "princi-
ples" they propose is a warning about time-indeterminacy.48 Similarly,
in a recent study requested by EPA to evaluate the strengths and weak-
nesses of new approaches to valuing mortality risks, there was no men-
tion of time-indeterminacy as an evaluative factor. 4 9
It is not that regulators do not realize that many risks will not
accrue until some time in the future. On the contrary, regulators rou-
tinely apply discount rates to future monetized risks to make them
comparable to current costs. 50 But there is no accommodation for the
possibility that study participants might also perceive a lag between
payment and risk reduction.
B. One Agency's Practice: EPA
Do study participants perceive any lag between payment and risk
reduction? To answer this question, this section focuses on the cost-
benefit practices used by a single agency: EPA. It gives a bit of back-
ground into EPA's monetization procedures and then looks more spe-
cifically at the two types of studies EPA uses to monetize risk. It
concludes that the studies regulators rely upon are largely time-inde-
terminate: they elicit people's willingness to pay for risk reductions
without identifying the time at which the risk reduction will occur. At
the same time, most of these studies measure at least some risks with
an objective period of latency-that is, some kind of measurable lag
between when participants would pay and when they would receive
the benefit of mortality risk reduction. This means that at least some
of the valuations we get from willingness-to-pay studies have latency
periods and discount rates incorporated into valuation. Current regu-
latory practice does not account for this, in fact, it compounds the
problem, because regulators routinely treat the numbers they get
from these studies as if they are valuations of immediate risks-as if
none of the studies ask people to value risks with any latency period at
all. As this section will discuss, this reading of the studies is
implausible.
48 See OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 2, at 23.
49 See U.S. ENvrL. PROT. AGENCY, REPORT OF THE EPA WORK GROUP ON VSL META-
ANALYSES 13-19 (2006) [hereinafter EPA, VSL META-ANALYSES], available at http://
yosemitel.epa.gov/ee/epa/eermfile.nsf/vwAN/EE-0494-O1.pdf.
50 In fact, OMB's Circular A-4 directs agencies to discount future benefits, see
OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 2, at 31-34, and it provides detailed recommendations
on how to discount accurately. See OMB CIRCULAR A-94, supra note 2, at 7-10.
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EPA is a good subject for this analysis for two reasons: (1) it deals
with a number of latent risks, and (2) it identifies the twenty-six spe-
cific studies on which it bases its cost-benefit analyses.51 Unlike many
other federal agencies, EPA has issued detailed guidelines to regula-
tors seeking to perform cost-benefit analyses. These guidelines make
cost-benefit practices at EPA relatively transparent, and therefore eas-
ier to evaluate. The fact that this analysis focuses on EPA is not meant
to single it out for criticism. On the contrary, EPA's practices are eas-
ier to criticize because they are more transparent, but they are pre-
sumably better for the same reason.
How generalizable is this critique to the practices of other federal
agencies? Highly, OMB's $1 million-$10 million VSL range was calcu-
lated based on the same studies that EPA uses, and while OMB directs
all federal agencies under its purview to follow that range, it does not
identify any methodology for dealing with time-indeterminacy. And
the fact that even the EPA does not address the time-indeterminacy in
its internal guidance suggests that this is a pervasive problem in regu-
latory analyses.5 2
1. Cost-Benefit Analysis at EPA
EPA is an independent executive agency, established in 1970 to
protect human health and the environment.5 3 EPA administers all or
part of over twenty-five environmental statutes, including the Clean
Air Act, 5 4 the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,5 5 the Safe Drink-
51 Furthermore, OMB's range for regulatory cost-benefit analyses ($1 to $10 mil-
lion) is drawn from meta-analyses that rely on these twenty-six studies. See U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING EcoNomic ANALYSIS 89 (2000) [hereinafter
EPA, 2000 GUIDELINES] (listing a table of all twenty-six studies in Ex. 7-3).
52 Furthermore, OMB's "recommended range" for regulatory cost-benefit analy-
ses ($1-$10 million (unknown $ year)) is drawn from meta-analyses that rely on these
twenty-six studies.
53 Unlike other agencies, EPA does not have only one enabling act establishing it
as an agency. Before 1970, environmental regulation was handled piecemeal by a
multiplicity of departments spread out across a number of federal agencies. THE pres-
ident transferred these functions to a single "Environmental Protection Agency." See
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623, 15,623-26 (Oct. 6, 1970).
Congress has effectively ratified the 1970 Plan by expressly delegating responsibility
for administering subsequent major environmental legislation to the "Administrator"
of EPA. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d) (2006) (granting the Administrator the author-
ity to administer the Federal Water Pollution Control Act); 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7601 (a)-7602 (2006) (authorizing the Administrator to prescribe regulations for
the Clean Air Act).
54 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7431 (establishing standards to protect outdoor air quality
and limit outdoor air pollution).
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ing Water Act,5 6 the Toxic Substances Control Act,5 7 the Solid Waste
Disposal Act,58 the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act59 ("Superfund"), and the Federal Insecti-
cide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act.60
Different statutes direct EPA to apply different forms of analyses.
Some require that regulations be promulgated on the basis of cost-
benefit analysis.61 Other statutes-particularly those established in
the 1970s, at the beginning of the environmental movement-focus
on "feasibility" analysis. 6 2 "[T]o the extent permitted by law," how-
ever, Executive Order 12,866 requires EPA to perform cost-benefit
analyses on all major proposed regulations.6 3 In practice, this has
meant that EPA performs cost-benefit analyses to satisfy the Executive
Order and feasibility studies to satisfy statutory feasibility
requirements. 64
Since 2000, cost-benefit analyses at EPA have been performed
according to its Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses.6 5 The
Guidelines encourage regulators to use a default central VSL of $5.8
55 33 U.S.C. §§ 1257-1387 (2006 & Supp. 2008) (regulating the discharge of pol-
lutants into navigable waters).
56 42 U.S.C. § 300j-26 (2006).
57 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (2006 & Supp. 2008) (regulating the use of hazardous
chemical substances).
58 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k) (2006 & Supp. 2008) (regulating the generation,
transport, management, and disposal of solid and hazardous wastes).
59 Id. §§ 9601-9675 (establishing a system of remediation and liability for the
release of hazardous substances).
60 7 U.S.C. §§ 1 36 -13 6y (2006 & Supp. 2008) (regulating the sale and distribu-
tion of substances used to kill insects, fungi, and rodents).
61 See, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1216, 1222 (5th Cir.
1991) (interpreting the Toxic Substances Control Act as requiring a cost-benefit
approach to limiting toxic substances).
62 The Clean Air Act, for example, requires air pollution emission standards to be
set for the "maximum degree of reduction . . . achievable." See 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412(d)(2) (2006). The Federal Water Pollution Control Act requires new sources
of water pollution to meet discharge limits reflecting the "best available demonstrated
control technology." See 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a) (1) (2006).
63 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 640 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(2006).
64 For an argument that feasibility-focused statutes should not be interpreted (as
they have been) as allowing for cost-benefit analysis, see David M. Driesen, Distributing
the Costs of Environmental, Health, and Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit
Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C. ENvrL. Ave. L. REV. 1, 3 (2005).
65 See EPA, 2000 GUIDELINES, supra note 51. An update to the Guidelines is pend-
ing review. See U.S. ENvrL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARINc ECONOMIC
ANALYsIs (External Review Draft Sept. 2008) [hereinafter EPA, 2008 GUIDELINES]. For
a discussion of EPA's monetization practices, see Robinson, supra note 38, at 288-93.
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million (1997 dollars), updated to the base year of the analysis. 66 As I
discuss in more detail below,67 this baseline VSL is the calculated
mean of twenty-six studies, which were performed between 1974 and
1991.68 Most-although not all-cost-benefit analyses performed by
EPA use this baseline VSL to calculate the monetized benefit of reduc-
ing mortality risks.6 9 Recently, EPA has also been investigating the
possibility of using more formal meta-analyses to set baseline VSLs:70
these meta-analyses rely on most of the same studies as EPA's own
analysis from 2000, and the figures they support are quite close to
EPA's existing recommendations. 71
EPA is well aware of the fact that many of the risks it manages
have latency periods. The Guidelines note that "[m] any environmen-
tal policies are targeted at reducing the risk of effects such as cancer,
where there may be an extended period of latency between the time
of exposure and eventual death from the disease."72 The Guidelines
devote an entire chapter to discounting,73 and encourage regulators
66 See EPA, 2000 GUIDELINES, supra note 51, at 90. EPA regulators tend to use the
Consumer Price Index to adjust for inflation, but the agency is aware that some econ-
omists prefer the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Deflator inflation index, and the
Guidelines merely direct analysts to use one or the other consistently. Id. at 90 n.31.
67 See infra Part II.B.2.
68 See EPA, 2000 GUIDELINES supra note 51, at 89 ex. 7-3 (listing the studies on
which EPA relies). The September 2008 draft of the Guidelines currently recom-
mends a central baseline mean based on these same studies. See EPA, 2008 GUIDE-
LINES, supra note 65, at 7-6 n.106. In 2006 dollars, this results in a baseline $7.0
million VSL. Id. at 7-6.
69 See Robinson, supra 38; see also EPA, 2008 GUIDELINES, supra note 65, at 7-6
(noting that some programs may vary from this default).
70 See EPA, VSL META-ANALYSES, supra note 49, at 2; see also EPA, 2008 GUIDE-
LINES, supra note 65, at 7-6 (discussing air programs using VSL based on meta-
analyses).
71 EPA recommends a $7.0 million VSL (2006 dollars), while analyses relying on
meta-analyses have typically used a $6.6 million VSL (2006 dollars). See EPA, 2008
GUIDELINES, supra note 65, at 7-6; see also U.S. ENvn.. PROT. AGENCY, SUMMARY OF THE
UPDATED REGULATORY IMPAcr ANALYSIS (RIA) FOR THE RECONSIDERATION OF THE 2008
OZONE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QuALTIY STANDARD (NAAQS), at S1-4 (2008), available
at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/regdata/RIAs/sl-supplemental-analysis-full.pdf
(comparing current estimates to estimates derived from meta-analyses). In 2006, EPA
commissioned a study on the possible use of meta-analyses in valuing mortality risks.
EPA, VSL META-ANALYSES, supra note 49, at 2. It then sought guidance from the Sci-
ence Advisory Board on this and other proposed changes to valuation practices.
72 EPA, 2000 GUIDELINES, supra note 51, at 92; see also U.S. ENvrL. PROT. AGENCY,
VALUING THE BENEFITS OF FATAL CANCER RISK REDUCTIONS (2006).
73 EPA, 2000 GUIDELINES, supra note 51, at 33-57.
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to adjust for "latency periods" between exposure to a risk and fatality
by discounting the value of future risk reductions.7 4
Although EPA encourages regulators to account for the timing of
risks, the Guidelines do not direct regulators to consider the timing of
risks from the perspective of study participants. Only a single line in
the Guidelines addresses the timing of the valuations, and then only
to breezily claim that "existing VSL estimates are based upon risks of
relatively immediate fatalities."7 5 In its reviews, EPA's Science Advi-
sory Board has supported this reading of the literature.76 Accord-
ingly, EPA cost-benefit analyses routinely discount VSLs as if they
represent valuations of immediate risks.7 7
2. A Review of the Studies
Do the willingness-to-pay values used by agencies elicit present
values of the underlying risk reduction-as regulators assume-or do
they elicit valuations of future risk? Review of the twenty-six studies
used by EPA suggests that most are time-indeterminate in that they
74 See id. at 92.
75 Id. The 2008 draft of the Guidelines operates based on the same assumption:
it distinguishes between latency (the time difference between initial exposure to a
contaminant and an increase in health risk) and cessation lag (the time difference
between reduction in exposure and a reduction in observed health effects), and con-
cludes that both should be "discounted at the same rate as other benefits and costs in
the analysis." EPA, 2008 GUIDELINES, supra note 65, at 6-23.
76 The Science Advisory Board (SAB) was established by Congress in 1978 to
advise EPA on technical matters. See Environmental Research, Development, and
Demonstration Authorization Act of 1978 (ERDDAA), Pub. L. No. 95-155, § 8, 91 Stat.
1257, 1260 (1977) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4365 (2006)). For SAB com-
ments on EPA's discounting practices, see U.S. ENvT. PROT. AGENCY, AN SAB REPORT
ON THE EPA GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOmic ANALYSIs, § 3.1, at 3 (1999) (sup-
porting EPA's discounting practices). Six years later, in its report to EPA on EPA's
white paper Valuing the Benefits of Fatal Cancer Risk Reductions, the SAB did note an
example of a study where "[t]he study itself suggests that the subjects believed that
there was a latency period." U.S. ENvrT. PROT. AGENCY, AN SAB REPORT ON EPA's
WHITE PAPER VALUING THE BENEFITS OF FATAL CANCER RISK REDUCTION 12 (2009) (cit-
ing Wesley A. Magat et al., A Reference Lottery Metric for Valuing Health, 42 MGMT. ScI.
1118, 1127 (1996)). The report acknowledges the possibility that some respondents
might have assumed there was a latency period, but goes on to recommend that EPA
continue to discount its valuations. Id. at 12-14.
77 See EPA, 2000 GUIDELINES, supra note 51 at 92 (recommending that regulators
discount the valuations); Robinson, supra note 38, at 292-93; see also U.S. ENvrt..
PROT. AGENCY, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL STAGE 2 DISINFECTANTS AND DisIN-
FECTION BYPRODUCES RULE, at ES-25 to ES-27 (2005), available at http://www.epa.
gov/safewater/disinfection/stage2/pdfs/anaylsisstage2 ecconomic-main.pdf (ana-
lyzing the costs and benefits of a proposed regulation limiting the amount of disinfec-
tant in drinking water; applying a 3% and 7% discount rate to cancer mortality risks).
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measure risks of unclear vintage-and that many measure risks with
objective periods of latency.
EPA recommends its baseline VSL of $5.8 million (1997 dollars)
on the basis of twenty-six studies.7 8 These studies fall into two general
categories: wage/risk studies and stated preference studies. Both
types of studies seek to determine how much people are willing to pay
for reductions in risk, but they look to different types of evidence for
those valuations.
a. Wage/Risk Studies
Of the twenty-six studies EPA relies upon, twenty-one are wage/
risk studies, which examine the risk premiums paid to workers for
increases in job-related mortality risk.79 These studies operate on the
assumption that people demand compensation to be exposed to
increased risk, so that greater risk equals increased pay.80 Naturally
other factors affect pay as well-the education of the worker, for
example, or her gender or union status-and most studies seek to
hold these additional factors constant so that they can focus on the
amount workers are paid to assume additional risk.81 Nevertheless, a
basic assumption of this approach is that people are aware of the type
and magnitude of the risks they face in their workplaces.
To measure people's valuations of workplace mortality risk,
wage/risk studies compare wages82 to some measure of occupational
mortality. They typically rely on massive datasets that incorporate a
78 See EPA, 2000 GUIDELINES, supra note 51, at 90; see also EPA, 2008 GUIDELINES,
supra note 65, at 7-6 (providing an updated VSL of $7.0 million (2006 dollars)).
79 For the list of studies, see EPA, 2000 GUIDELINES, supra note 51, at 90. For a
description of the development of wage/risk studies, see W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of
Life: Estimates with Risks by Occupation and Industry, 42 EcoN. INQUIRY 29, 30-31 (2004);
see also W. Kip Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS 17-98 (1992) (discussing issues involving
wage/risk studies).
80 See, e.g., Alan Marin & George Psacharopoulos, The Reward for Risk in the Labor
Market: Evidence from the United Kingdom and a Reconciliation with Other Studies, 90 J. POL.
EcoN. 827, 827 (1982) (citing ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 116-17 (R.H. Camp-
bell & A.S. Skinner eds., Clarendon Press 1976) (1776)) (investigating whether work-
ers in modem Britain are pair risk premiums as Adam Smith predicted should occur
in competitive labor markets); see also SMITH, supra, at 116-17 ("The . . . following are
the ... circumstances which . .. make up for a small pecuniary gain in some employ-
ments, and counter-balance a great one in others: first, the agreeableness or disagree-
ableness of the employments themselves . ... The wages of labour vary with the ease
or hardship . . . of the employment.").
81 See, e.g., Marin & Psacharopoulos, supra note 80, at 833.
82 Most commonly annual salary, but some also look at weekly or monthly wages.
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wide variety of mortality risks. It is here that time-indeterminacy
problems creep in to the analysis.
Consider the structure of one wage/risk study incorporated into
EPA's baseline VSL.83 This study compared a salary survey84 to all 1.5
million of the workman's compensation claims filed in Quebec
between January 1981 and May 1985.85 It found that, on average, an
increased mortality risk of 1-in-100,000 was correlated with an increase
in yearly salary of $32 (1986 U.S. dollars).86 EPA adjusted this to a
VSL of $4.4 million (1997 U.S. dollars), significantly below its baseline
mean of $5.8 million (1997 U.S. dollars). 7
Where is the problem here? It is in the data from the workman's
compensation claims. Like most workman's compensation schemes,
the Quebecois system provides compensation both for workplace inju-
ries and for illnesses arising from the workplace.88 That means that
83 The study in question is a Canadian study. SeeJean-Michel Cousineau et al.,
Occupational Hazard and Wage Compensating Differentials, 74 REV. ECON. & STAT. 166
(1992). EPA incorporates six foreign studies into its baseline VSL. EPA, 2000 GUIDE-
LINES, supra note 51, at 89. These include four wage/risk studies: the Canadian study
by Cousineau; a U.K. study by Marin & Psacharopoulos, supra note 80; Australian and
Japanese studies published in Thomas J. Kniesner & John D. Leeth, Compensating
Wage Differentials for Fatal Injury Risk in Australia, Japan, and the United States, 4J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 75 (1991); and two stated preference studies: a New Zealand study by
MILLER & GURIA, supra note 11, and a U.K. study by Michael Jones-Lee, The Value of
Changes in the Probability ofDeath or Injury, 82 J. POL. ECON. 835 (1974). For a compari-
son of foreign and U.S. VSL estimates, see Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 3 (particularly
section 5). Most objections to using foreign studies in U.S. VSL calculations have
centered on whether foreign risk preferences are similar to U.S. ones. The Viscusi &
Aldy study finds that they are. See id. at 6 ("[N]otwithstanding the quite different
labor market conditions throughout the world, the general order of magnitude of ...
foreign VSL estimates tends to be similar to that in the United States."). But even if
foreign preferences are somewhat similar to U.S. preferences, we might still be con-
cerned at the implications of using foreign preferences to set U.S. policy.
84 The salary survey was completed by Labour Canada in 1979, and provided
wage data, job, and employee characteristics. The salary survey alone had 32,713 dis-
tinct hourly wage rate observations. Cousineau et al., supra note 83, at 166.
85 Id. at 166-67.
86 See id. at 169 & n.5.
87 EPA, 2000 GUIDELINES, supra note 51, at 89.
88 An Act Respecting Industrial Accidents and Occupational Diseases, R.S.Q., ch.
A-3.001 (1985) (Can.) guarantees Quebecois the right to medical aid, compensation,
rehabilitation, and return to work. It also defines "employment injury": it "means an
injury or a disease arising out of or in the course of an industrial accident, or an
occupational disease, including a recurrence, relapse, or aggravation." This act
replaced the Worker's Compensation Act, R.S.Q., ch. 52 (1969) (Can.), which also
provided compensation for both "accidents" and occupational diseases." For occupa-
tional diseases, "[t]he beneficiary's claim must be presented within six months of the
date when it is medically established and brought to his attention that he is suffering
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this study could not distinguish between the same probability of risk
for latent and immediate risks of injury/disease: between a workplace
where there was a 1-in-100,000 risk of dying immediately and a work-
place where there was a 1-in-10 0 ,0 0 0 risk of dying in twenty years. To
the extent that workers were aware of the risks they faced-and this
methodology assumes that either individual workers or the labor mar-
ket in general accounts for actual risks-this means that the average
$32 wage premium the study identified was for some combination of
immediate and latent risks. And that means that using this study as if
it valued only immediate risk-as EPA has every time it has applied its
baseline VSL in a cost-benefit analysis-leads to undervaluation of
risk.
This study is not alone in this problem. Several other studies
used to calculate EPA's baseline VSL rely on workman's compensation
data with similar issues.89
Other studies use different sources for mortality data, but many
of these are problematic as well. One common choice was to use mor-
tality data collated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in its Survey of
Occupational Injuries and Illnesses (SOII).9o These data were pub-
lished annually starting in 1970, and until 1992, and they reported the
number of fatal and nonfatal industrial injuries and illnesses suffered
by workers in different industries. As with the workers' compensation
from an occupational disease, or of the date of his death therefrom, as the case may
be." Id. at XI.111.
89 See Richard J. Butler, Wage and Injury Rate Responses to Shifting Levels of Workers'
Compensation, in SAFETY AND THE WORKFORCE 61, 85 (John D. Worrall ed., 1983) (rely-
ing on workman's compensation claims from South Carolina and finding a VSL of
$1.3 million in 1997 dollars); Alan E. Dillingham, The Influence of Risk Variable Defini-
tion on Value-of-Life Estimates, 23 ECON. INQUIRY 277, 289-93 (1985) (relying on 1970
data from New York Worker's Compensation records and the Census and finding a
VSL of $1.1 million in 1997 dollars); Kniesner & Leeth, supra note 83, at 82-83 (rely-
ing on workman's compensation claims from Australia and finding a VSL of $4.0
million in 1997 dollars).
90 Studies relied upon by EPA that used pre-1992 Bureau of Labor Statistics data
to construct their VSL include John Garen, Compensating Wage Differentials and the
Endogeneity of Job Riskiness, 70 REv. ECON. & STAT. 9, 11-15 (1988) (calculating $16.3
million VSL in 1997 dollars, relying on BLS data from 1981 to 1982); J. Paul Leigh. &
Roger N. Folsom, Estimates of the Value of Accident Avoidance at the Job Depend on the
Concavity of the Equalizing Differences Curve, 24 Q. REV. ECON. & Bus. 56 (1984) (calcu-
lating $11.7 million VSL in 1997 dollars); Michael J. Moore & W. Kip Viscusi, The
Quantity-Adjusted Value of Life, 26 ECON. INQUIRY 369 (1988) (relying on BLS data from
1973 to 1976); and Craig A. Olson, An Analysis of Wage Differentials Received by Workers
on Dangerous jobs, 16 J. Hum. REsOURCEs 167 (1981) (calculating $6.3 million VSL in
1997 dollars; relying on BLS data from 1973). For VSL figures stated, see EPA, 2000
GUIDEUNES, supra note 51, at 89.
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studies, these studies cannot distinguish between risk premiums paid
to workers for (latent) risks of fatal illness and those paid for (more
immediate) risks of fatal injury.
In 1992, a year after the last study incorporated into EPA's base-
line VSL was performed, the Bureau of Labor Statistics began provid-
ing a Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI), which is carefully
collated to include only those fatalities that are "traumatic" (i.e. imme-
diate) and occupational in nature.tu Many recent studies rely on
these data.92
There is reason to consider potential time-indeterminacy even
amongst these studies, however. It might be reasonable to calculate
some latency period even for injury-related deaths. This is particularly
true in industries where multiple-fatality accidents drive up total num-
bers. In coal mining, for instance, fatal work injury statistics more
than doubled between 2005 and 2006, because of multiple-fatality
accidents.9 3 Where mortality rates vary significantly across time, work-
ers might reasonably assume that there will be some latency between
when they are paid and when they assume the relevant risk.
We might also care about perceived latency-about whether
workers valuing risks tend to perceive those risks as latent or immedi-
ate. Even a small amount of perceived latency may lead to enormous
decreases in valuation,9 4 so even very small perceived latencies should
give regulators grounds for concern.
Do people perceive the risks that face them at work as latent?
Research in risk perception suggests that some perceived latency
period is the norm for many, if not most, of the kinds of risks that
people face each day.95 In one study, for example, participants were
asked to rate the "immediacy" of thirty different kinds of risk on a
91 See Viscusi, supra note 79, at 31.
92 See id. (using CFOI data).
93 Compare BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FATAL OCCUPA-
TIONAL INJURIES, EMPLOYMENT, AND RATES OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES BY
SELECTED WORKER CHARACTERISTICS, OCCUPATIONS AND INDUSTRIES 3 (2006), http://
www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cfoi-rates_2006.pdf (reporting forty-seven coal mining
deaths in 2006), with BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FATAL Occu-
PATIONAL INJURIES, EMPLOYMENT, AND RATES OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES BY
SELECTED WORKER CHARACTERISTICS, OCCUPATIONS AND INDUSTRIES 3 (2005), http://
www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cfoi-rates-2005.pdf (reporting twenty-two coal mining
deaths in 2005).
94 Particularly where people discount hyperbolically. See supra note 6.
95 For an analysis of various characteristics (including "immediacy") of thirty
types of common risk, see Baruch Fischhoff et al., How Safe Is Safe Enough? A Psychomet-
-ic Study ofAttitudes Toward Technological Risks and Benefits, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 80,
92-97 (Paul Slovic ed., 2000).
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scale of one to seven, where one was "immediate."9 6 The three most
"immediate" sources of risk-handguns, hunting, and general avia-
tion-still averaged out measurably above a "one" (i.e. "immediate")
on this scale.9 7 That suggests that even for sources of risk with objec-
tively short latency periods, the average person perceives some mea-
surable amount of latency. Because we know latency affects people's
valuations-and that people pay more to reduce immediate risks than
future ones-this is a potential source of inadvertent double-discount-
ing and an additional reason to be concerned about the valuations
that regulators currently use to attach monetary values to mortality
risks.
b. Stated Preference Studies
Five of the studies on which EPA relies are stated preference stud-
ies.98 Stated preference studies elicit preferences by asking for them,
rather than by observing people's actual behavior.99
The studies relied upon by EPA have various structures. In gen-
eral, however, they have two phases: an initial phase, where they seek
to inform and educate the participants about the risks they will be
asked to value; and a second phase, where they ask about the partici-
pants' preferences.
The "educational" phase of the studies can be quite extensive.
The Miller and Guria study, for example, was administered by an
interviewer to a randomized sample of 629 persons, living in different
households across New Zealand. 100 The interviewer began by inform-
ing the participant that "[w]e're trying to find out what you think
96 Fischhoff et al. look at the perceived "immediacy" of the following types of risk:
alcoholic beverages, bicycles, commercial aviation, contraceptives, electric power, fire
fighting, food coloring, food preservatives, general aviation, handguns, high-school/
college football, home appliances, hunting, large construction, motorcycles, motor
vehicles, mountain climbing, nuclear power, pesticides, power mowers, police work,
prescription antibiotics, railroads, skiing, smoking, spray cans, surgery, swimming, vac-
cinations, and x-rays. See id.
97 More specifically, at a 1.66. See id.
98 See MILLER & GuRIu, supra note 11; Doug Gegax et al., Valuing Safety: Two
Approaches, in 4 EXPERIMENTAL METHODS FOR ASSESSING ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS 65
(1985) [hereinafter Gegax et al., Valuing Safety]; Douglas Gegax et al., Perceived Risk
and the Marginal Value of Safety, 73 REv. ECON. & STAT. 589, 509-91 (1991) [hereinafter
Gegax et al., Perceived Risk]; Jones-Lee, supra note 83, at 837; Wesley A Magat et al.,
Issues in Valuing Health Risks: Applications of Contingent Valuation and Conjoint Measure-
ment to Nerve Diseases and Lymphoma, in DRArr REPORT TO THE EPA 7-10 (1991).
99 None of these stated preference studies require participants to actually pay for
any risk reductions.
100 See MILLER & GuIA, supra note 1, at 5.
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about the risks we all face when travelling on the roads, and how
much you value safety when travelling."10 1 The interviewer then pro-
ceeded through a series of sections: defining risk,102 attempting to
contextualize the probabilities, 03 and testing for comprehension. 04
Only then did the interviewer reach the point of inquiring as to peo-
ple's willingness to pay to reduce risks.105
Other studies had less extensive educational portions. The
Gegax et al.' 0 6 and the Gerking et al. studies 07 were based on the
101 See id. app. 2, at 1. Participants were also reassured that "because we want to
know how you feel about these things, don't worry about giving the 'right' answer-
what's important is what you believe!" Id.
102 The study administrators told participants, "When we say that something is
'risky,' we mean that there might be an accident. The larger the risk, the greater the
chance that something will go wrong. When we measure risk, we talk about the num-
ber of people involved in accidents." Id. app. 2, at 2.
103 This study provided numerical contextualizing information, see id. ("In 1987 in
New Zealand there were 797 people killed in road accidents. This is the same as
saying that out of every 10,000 New Zealanders around 3 were killed in a road acci-
dent during 1987.. . . The figures 3 in 10,000 tell us how large the risk of death on
the road is."), and visual information, see id. (describing a piece of graph paper,
shown to participants, with 10,000 squares, 3 of which were red).
104 One of the comprehension tests from this study ran as follows:
Imagine that you decide to go for a walk. To get to your destination
there are two different ways to go. Both ways involve walking across busy
streets. Crossing Kauri Street your risk of death is 2 in 10,000. Crossing
Lupin Street your risk of death is 20 in 10,000. [The interviewer showed an
explanatory card at this point, with a diagram of the question.] Which is the
safer street to cross? 1) Kauri Street where the risk is 2 in 10,000, or 2) Lupin
Street where the risk is 20 in 10,000?
See id. Responses from participants who answered two were omitted from the analysis.
See id. at 5.
105 This particular study was measuring people's willingness to pay for greater
safety on roadways. It attempted to elicit this through several different questions.
One of these was this:
"Imagine that you have to travel in a car for a distance of 20 kilometres
each weekday for some reason. You can use two different routes-one a
high risk road and the other a low risk road. But before you can travel on
the low risk road you must pay a fee-a toll. The time taken to travel on
each road is the same. [A diagram was provided here.] The toll road will
reduce your risk of dying in an accident (for each year you travel) from 6 in
10,000 to 3 in 10,000. How much would you pay per one way trip to use the
toll road?" After the answer was given, the interviewer was directed to say:
"That's about _ per year to reduce your risk of death from 6 in 10,000 to 3
in 10,000. Is that O.K.?" Participants were then permitted to change their
answer, if they chose to do so.
See id. app. 2, at 4.
106 See Gegax et al., Valuing Safety, supra note 98, at 65-66.
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same mail survey, which was sent to a cross-section of the U.S. popula-
tion in 1984. This survey informed participants of the thirteen "major
causes of how people die on the job," and provided a "ladder" portray-
ing the riskiness of various occupations.os People were told:
The ladder below shows levels of job-related accidental risk of
death. Each step shows the number of deaths per year for every
4,000 people in an occupation. The higher on the ladder, the more
accidental "on the job" deaths there are each year for that occupa-
tion. A few example occupations are given and they are placed on
the ladder according to their actual levels of risk. Note that school-
teachers have about one death per 4,000 workers and lumberjacks
have about 10 deaths per 4,000 workers each year.109
The next questions asked participants to assign their own job a step
on the ladder, and how much they would pay (or accept) to move
down (or up) the ladder.o1 0 From the answers to these questions,
these studies calculated a VSL of $2.1 million (1984 dollars). "'
At first glance, this study seems less problematic than many of the
wage-risk studies, because it at least purports to ask about 'job-related
accidental risk of death," which sounds relatively immediate at an
intuitive level. As with the risks faced by people in the wage/risk stud-
ies, however, there may be reason to be concerned that people do not
perceive most risk as entirely immediate (i.e., without any latency
period whatsoever). Several of the thirteen "major causes of how peo-
ple die on the job" identified in the Gerking et al. study have close
corollaries in the Fischhoff et al. study on risk perception: compare,
for example, "on the road motor vehicle accident" to risks from
"motor vehicles" (perceived immediacy = 2.33); "fire" to "fire fighting"
(2.33); "airplane crash" to "general aviation (1.66).112
107 Shelby Gerking et al., The Marginal Value of Job Safety: A Contingent Valuation
Study, I J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 185, 186 (1988).
108 See Gegax et al., Valuing Safety, supra note 98, app. at 100-01.
109 Id. app. at 101. The ten-step ladder provided the following "rankings": (1)
Schoolteachers; (2) House painters; (4) Electricians; (6) Crane and derrick opera-
tors; (7) Miners; (8) Structural ironworkers; (10) Lumbejacks. See id.
110 See id. app. at 102-03.
111 See id. at 90. EPA adjusted this to $4.0 million (1997 dollars). See EPA, 2000
GUIDELINES, supra note 51, at 89.
112 See Gegax et al., Valuing Safety, supra note 98, at app. A. In decreasing order,
the thirteen causes were: on the road motor vehicle accident; a fall; heart attack;
getting hit by industrial vehicle or equipment; getting hit by an object other than
vehicle or equipment; getting caught in, under, or between objects other than vehicle
or equipment; electrocution; gun shot; airplane crash; fire; plant machinery opera-
tion; explosion; gas inhalation. See id.; cf Fischhoff et al., supra note 95, at 92-93
(measuring other activities and technologies).
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The other three stated preference studies used by EPA all
attempted to elicit people's valuations of lower mortality risks from
traffic accidents.113 Again, these studies seem less problematic than
the wage/risk studies, because the range of risks they measure (and
therefore the variance in the latency of the risks they measure) is rela-
tively narrow. It is true that people appear to perceive risks from
motor vehicles as having some measurable latency period, but the
source of risk is narrow enough that we have a latency period on
which to focus." 4 Two of these studies also included some kind of
explicit instruction as to the timing of the risk" 5-a relatively easy fix
to include in future stated preference studies, and one that presuma-
bly limits the variance in perceived latency.
Did the people in the stated preference studies used that EPA
used perceive the risks they faced at work as wholly immediate, then,
as regulators assume? Possibly. At the least, it would be reasonable to
think that participants in the five stated preference studies may have
perceived the risks they valued as more immediate than the ones faced
by the participants in the wage/risk studies. Of course, any amount of
perceived latency may be cause for alarm, since any perceived latency
will lead to some amount of double-discounting. But as a comparative
matter, the stated preference studies EPA uses are less time-indetermi-
nate than the wage/risk studies.
C. Policy Implications of Time-Indeterminacy
Why does any of this matter? What happens when regulators use
time-indeterminate studies as if they elicit willingness-to-pay for imme-
diate risks? If even some of the participants in a willingness-to-pay
study think that they are valuing latent risk instead of immediate risk,
they will apply their own discount rate to the valuation. In combina-
tion with current discounting practice, this leads to the undervalua-
tion of both immediate and future benefits.
113 See MILLER & GURIA, supra note 11; Jones-Lee, supra note 83, at 845-46; Kip
Viscusi et al., Pricing Environmental Health Risks: Survey Assessments of Risk-Risk and Risk-
Dollar Trade-Offs for "Chronic Bronchitis," 21 J. ENvT. ECON. & McMT. 44-50 (1991).
114 See Fischhoff, supra note 95, at 92 (perceived immediacy of "motor vehicles"
risk was 2.33 on a 1-7 scale).
115 The Miller & Guria study in particular tended to assign times to valuations.
See, e.g., MILLER & GUUA, supra note 11. Unfortunately, the timing of risks being
valued was not consistent across the study questions, so the mean VSL that EPA uses
from that study-$1.5 million in 1997 dollars-is time-indeterminate, even though
the actual study provided several different estimates that had a time attached to them.
See id. The Viscusi et al. study, supra note 13, asked participants about their risk of
dying in an automobile accident in the next year.
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Immediate benefits are undervalued because regulators treat the
VSL as if it is a valuation of immediate benefit. But the willingness-to-
pay numbers being elicited are (at least in part) willingness-to-pay for
the future risk reduction-that is, they are the discounted value of the
risk reduction, adjusted for the presumed latency period. And of
course it is inappropriate to use discounted figures to value immediate
risks.
Future benefits are undervalued because regulators discount
figures drawn from these studies-and the figures have already been
(at least partially) discounted by the participants in the study.
Note that there is no countervailing error here that leads to bene-
fits being overvalued:116 no one is incorporating past costs or benefits
into cost-benefit analysis, so there is no corollary opportunity for past
benefits to be double-compounded (which would be the opposite of
double-discounting). Because regulatory cost-benefit analyses are pro-
spective, time-indeterminacy merely depresses the apparent value of
regulatory risks. This means that risks to life and health are being
systematically under valued. To the extent cost-benefit analyses
informs regulatory policy, even at the margin, this suggests that fed-
eral regulations are underprotecting the public against regulatory risks.
III. TowARDS A (PARTIAL) SOLUTION
Regulators need to know when a risk is being valued to determine
how much it is being valued. This requires two things. First, regulators
must know when a risk is being valued-so regulatory practices should
be built on time-determinate studies. To that end, this Part recom-
mends a few strategies for increasing the time-determinacy of valua-
tion studies.
But time-determinate studies are not sufficient on their own. As
the second section in this Part explains, once they have time-determi-
nate valuations, regulators must match their discounting practices to
the timing of those valuations. Discounting should be used to adjust
the monetary value of goods so that expenditures at different times
can be meaningfully compared to one another. That means that only
future valuations should be discounted, and that they should only be
discounted once, not twice.
116 Of course there might be other errors in the calculations, so I cannot speak to
the net result of cost-benefit analyses. Here, I mean only that regulators are not some-
how offsetting double-discounting with double compounding.
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A. Improving Time-Determinacy
How can regulators make studies time-determinate, or at least
more time-determinate? I can see several paths towards improvement.
First, if regulators want to use wage/risk studies to value risk
reductions, they should adjust these studies for implicit latency. One
option here is to identify the objective expected latency of whatever is
being measured and assume that that is the time period participants
are using. Another option would be to use existing studies on the
perception of risks to adjust for the subjective latency of various risk
sources. Neither of these is going to make wage/risk studies perfectly
time-determinate, because the structure of these studies relies on
implicit risk assessments. But either of these approaches would offer
substantive improvement, and future wage/risk studies can be struc-
tured to account for potential latency in risk measurements.
Second, study designers should incorporate time-stamps into
stated preference studies. Studies should elicit people's willingness to
pay either for "immediate" risks or for risks with a particular
latency. 117
Finally, regulators should beware meta-analyses. By their nature,
meta-analyses require cross-study comparisons: meta-analyses seek to
aggregate data from a number of studies, to create a more meaningful
baseline from which to work than a bare average. Because they neces-
sarily compare across studies; however, they suffer from a particular
vulnerability to potential time-indeterminacy. Unless the studies all
have the same latency period, it is senseless to attempt to aggregate
them: it is like aggregating dollars, yen, and euros, and expecting to
get a meaningful number at the end. From this perspective, the grow-
ing popularity of meta-analyses is a troubling development.118
B. Choosing When to Value Preferences
If the solution to time-indeterminate analysis is to use time-deter-
minate willingness-to-pay studies, however, we are left with a signifi-
cant dilemma. Agencies should use time-determinate studies to
117 Note that some stated preference studies already do this. See, e.g., MILLER &
GuLA, supra note 11.
118 EPA has yet to explicitly incorporate meta-analyses into its Guidelines,
although a few analyses have already been run with VSLs based on meta-analyses.
EPA, 2008 GUIDELINES, supra note 65, at 7-6. Needless to say, recent agency evalua-
tions of these meta-analyses have not identified either double discounting or time
indeterminacy as a potential problem. See EPA, VSL META-ANALYSES, supra note 49, at
25 (failing to mention double discounting or time indeterminacy as issues to be
considered).
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determine how much people are willing to pay for regulatory goods,
because money has a time value, and without knowing when the pay-
ment is to be made, we do not actually know how much people are
willing to pay. But in that case, when should we measure willingness to
pay? This is a surprisingly difficult question. To see why, let us imag-
ine two possible practices for valuing future risk reductions.
First, regulators might simply elicit people's current willingness to
pay for the future benefit. They might, in other words, seek to ask:
"How much would you pay now to avert a 1-in-100,000 risk of dying
from cancer in twenty years?" This would be asking the participant to
identify the present value they attach to the benefit of the risk reduc-
tion in twenty years. If the participant responded to this question with
"$3," there would be no need for regulators to discount this figure. In
fact, it would be an error to do so, because the answer is already
framed as a present value: discounting it would just give us mathemati-
cal nonsense. If the participant says $3, then that is the present value
of the future benefit.
A second option would be this: we could elicit people's willing-
ness to pay for a current benefit and then assume that the underlying
value of the risk remains constant through time. This approach is
essentially what regulators have been trying to do for decades. As an
initial step, then, regulators might ask: "How much would you pay
now to avert a 1-in-100,000 risk of dying immediately?" The answer
would be the present value of the immediate risk. To use this figure
to value future risks, regulators would have to make an additional
assumption: that there is (or at least should be) no intertemporal vari-
ation in valuations. That is, they must assume that it is appropriate to
attach the same underlying value to risk reductions regardless of when
they occur.
Either of these approaches would give regulators current valua-
tions of future risk. Both approaches result in discounted figures-
the first option discounted by study participants, the second by regula-
tors. Obviously these are either-or options because either practice
gives us the present value of the valuations, so we would never want to
combine them together, lest we return to current practice-inadver-
tent double-discounting, and the undervaluation of regulatory
benefits.
Does it matter which we choose? If both of these paths led to the
same destination, the choice between them would be less fraught. But
there is reason to think that there would be large differences between
them. That is because the first option (valuation of future risks) asks
study participants to provide their own discount rates, while the sec-
ond option (valuation of immediate risks) requires regulators to apply
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a discount rate. These rates are likely to be vastly different: the best
evidence so far is that people do not apply a constant discount rate
even to money,119 and there is some evidence that they discount dif-
ferently depending upon whether they conceive themselves to be trad-
ing off money with money, or money with risk. 120 When a risk is
valued is therefore likely to affect the choice of the discount rate-
and therefore the valuations used in the final analyses.
There is no clear best choice from a methodological perspective
about when to value risks. Rather, which approach is preferable on
methodological grounds will depend upon a number of controversial
questions, including whether people are good agents for their future
selves, and whether they are good agents for future people. Resolving
these questions requires a sophisticated behavioral account of inter-
temporal decisionmaking, as well as deep normative accounts of the
appropriate role of the regulatory system within a democracy, and of
our ethical obligations to future persons. It is beyond the scope of
this Article to deal with these issues in the depth they deserve, so I
merely sketch some of the concerns here.
Consider the assumption that regulators must make to apply
immediate willingness-to-pay studies to future risks: that it is appropri-
ate to attach the same underlying value to risk reductions regardless
of when they occur. Why would we think that? Certainly it is not true
as a behavioral matter that people do attach the same value to risk
reductions no matter when they occur.121 On the contrary, people
119 See Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review,
40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 351, 360-62 (2002) (reviewing evidence of hyperbolic
discounting).
120 See Anna Alberini & Aline Chiabai, Discount Rates in Risk v. Money and Money v.
Money Tradeoffs 4 (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Working Paper No. 8.2006, 2006),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=876934 (finding that "the discount rate in
money v. risk tradeoffs is about 2%, while that in money v. money tradeoffs is 8.7%").
This suggests that when a good is monetized may determine whether the figures elic-
ited are discounted at the rate for money vs. risk or risk vs. risk.
121 See id. at 2; Alberini, supra note 5, at 231 (finding that delaying the time at
which the risk reduction occurs by ten to thirty years decreases the willingness to pay
for reduced mortality risk by greater than 60% in samples of people forty to sixty years
old). For a discussion on the social discount rate literature, see Mark K. Dreyfus & W.
Kip Viscusi, Rates of Time Preference and Consumer Valuations of Automobile Safety and Fuel
Efficiency, 38J. L. & ECON. 79, 103 (1995) (estimating an 11-17% rate of time prefer-
ence); Moore & Viscusi, supra note 90, at 386 (finding that workers discount future
life years at 9.6-12.2% imputed discount rate); and W. Kip Viscusi & Michael J.
Moore, Rates of Time Preference and Valuations of the Duration of Life, 38 J. PUB. ECON.
297, 314 (1989) (calculating an implied discount rate of 10.7%).
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exhibit hyperbolic discounting 22 and dynamic inconsistency.12 3 Nor
is there reason to think that the valuations of people in the study are
coextensive with the interests of future persons. 2 4
It might be that people should attach the same value regardless of
when it occurs. This might be true either as a rational or an ethical
matter. Rationally speaking, it may be that hyperbolic discounting is
an irrational approach to valuation, at least intra-lifetime. Ethically
speaking, it may be that it is unethical, immoral, or inappropriate to
value harms to future generations less than we value harms to our-
selves. But is it the appropriate role of the regulatory system to
enforce ethical norms? And under what circumstances ought it to do
so: as a strong default, a weak default, or only upon exceptional cir-
cumstances, when there is compelling reason to believe that people's
bare preferences are fundamentally unethical?
If people do not express preference for intertemporal neutrality,
what should policymakers do? Three options spring to mind. First,
policymakers might simply enforce existing expressed preferences,
regardless of whether those preferences appear to be informed and/
or ethical. Second, policymakers might implement what they (the
policymakers) believe to be the ethical or appropriate policy, regard-
less of expressed preferences. Or third, policymakers might choose
either policy as a default and create opt-out or change provisions to
allow for preference change over time. 125
These approaches have different benefits and drawbacks, and it is
beyond the scope of this article to discuss them in depth. For now,
the point is merely that different valuation practices should be paired
with complementary discounting practices.
122 That is, people's valuations of goods do not decline in value linearly over time.
See Frederick et al., supra note 119, at 360-62; Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1539-40 (1998).
123 That is, people's preferences are not constant over time, such that what they
prefer at one point in time is inconsistent with what is preferred at another point in
time. See George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evi-
dence and an Interpretation, 107 Q.J. EcoN. 573, 594-96 (1992) (discussing the effect of
time delays on discounting); Richard Thaler, Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Incon-
sistency, 8 EcoN. LETTERS 201, 205 (1981) (finding individual discount rates for gains
vary inversely with the size of the reward and the length of time until it is received).
124 See ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 15; Sunstein & Rowell, supra note 4, at 178.
125 For a model based on opt-outs, see Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler,
Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1159, 1190-1202 (2003).
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IV. OBJECTIONS
This Article has argued that the timing of preferences matters
and discounting practices should be consistent with valuation prac-
tices. How might this argument be resisted?
One response might be that the project of monetization is itself
problematic, because monetary valuations are necessarily incomplete
representations of the true worth goods like life and health. This may
be true, but it should not lead us to think that monetized valuations
are worthless. Even incomplete valuations can give us some useful
policy guidance. 126
Another response might be to object to the process of discount-
ing. That is, perhaps we should refuse to discount both immediate
valuations and future valuations, so that we spend the same amount of
money today to avert a mortality risk, regardless of when that mortality
risk will occur. This kind of objection to discounting is really an
objection to the project of monetization, because discounting follows
from the time-value of money.127
A third objection might focus on the interests of future genera-
tions. One influential legal article on discounting, for example, dis-
tinguishes between "latent harms" (harms to one's future self) and
"intergenerational harms" (harms to people who do not yet exist).128
It argues that our ethical obligations to future generations are differ-
ent than our ethical obligations to our future selves. The article con-
cludes that it is appropriate for us to discount the value of latent
harms, but not to discount the value of harms that accrue to future
generations.'29
We might have different obligations to people who exist now and
people who exist in the future. What is not clear is why this should
lead us to the conclusion that we should refuse to discount harms to
future generations. This response is problematic for two reasons.
First, it is very difficult-perhaps impossible-to create an
administrable distinction between latent harms and intergenerational
harms. Time has a habit of moving forward, and people keep dying,
being born, and having eighteenth birthdays: there is no fixed "pre-
sent" generation. This is a real problem for any regulatory system that
seeks to apply different analytical standards to present and future
people.
126 For a fuller discussion of this point, see supra notes 106-08.
127 See Sunstein & Rowell, supra note 4, at 181-86.
128 See Revesz, supra note 14, at 984-85, 1008-09.
129 See id. at 1015-17.
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Of course, practical administrative difficulties might not be dis-
positive if it were important enough as an ethical matter to distinguish
generations.130 But this leads to the second difficulty with tying dis-
counting policies to generationality: it is not so clear that the key ethi-
cal difficulties with intertemporality will divide along generational
lines. Many intertemporal difficulties seem instead to stem from clas-
sic agency problems of conflicting interests. The more the interests of
two people diverge, the less confident we feel about person one acting
as an agent for person two.
Future generations do not have a monopoly on divergent inter-
ests. We are often poor agents for other (existing) people and even
for our future selves.' 31 Consider this popular monologue from
comic Jerry Seinfeld:
I never get enough sleep. I stay up late at night, 'cause I'm Night
Guy. Night Guy wants to stay up late. "What about getting up after
five hours sleep?" Oh, that's Morning Guy's problem. That's not
my problem, I'm Night Guy. I stay up as late as I want. So you get
up in the morning, . .. you're exhausted, groggy: ooh I hate that
Night Guy! See, Night Guy always screws Morning Guy. There's
nothing Morning Guy can do.132
To the extent that their interests diverge-here, in the matter of
choosing a bedtime-Night Guy is a poor agent for Morning Guy.
This is not to say that Night Guy is a poor agent for Morning Guy
about all issues: on many issues, their interests likely converge, as both
share the corporeal body of Jerry Seinfeld, and no doubt the majority
130 After all, the regulatory system could apply an arbitrary "generational" cut off,
of say a quarter century, and make a policy determination that all citizens who have
been born by the time of the promulgation of the final regulation belong to the
"current" generation, and that "future" generations consist of everyone who has not
yet been born or attained citizenship (but who one day will). Or perhaps the policy
could include noncitizens who are in the country as well; only people who have
reached their eighteenth birthday; only people between the ages of eighteen and
thirty five; or only people who are all of these things and certifiably sane. Of course,
to decide which of these cut-offs to select-to decide who should qualify as a future
generation-we must make controversial normative decisions about who should
count as a person today. But perhaps it would be worth doing so for sufficient ethical
payoff.
131 For different models of intertemporal choice, see for example, DEREK PARFYT,
RFASONS AND PERSONs 211 (1984) (presenting the possibility of conceiving of people
as successive selves, brain and body, extending through time); John C. Harsanyi,
Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 39,
54-56 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982) (presenting a lifetime model
based on utilitarianism).
132 Seinfeld: The Glasses (NBC television broadcast Sept. 30, 1993).
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of their preferences. But Night Guy cannot be trusted to represent
Morning Guy's interests in the matter of choosing when to go to bed.
Perhaps we can presume that, on average, people have more
interests in common with their future selves than with other future
persons, so that generationality can be used as a proxy for quality of
agency. The danger of this approach is that it is likely to be both
overinclusive (as where existing people have significant interests in
common with as-yet-unborn children and grandchildren) and under-
inclusive (as where Night Guy stays up too late or where the interests
of an eighteen-year-old in looking tanned deviate significantly from
the interests of that same person at retirement age). But if the rele-
vant inquiry is really into how good an agent person one is for person
two, then that is the line we should draw for policy purposes.
If present persons do have a moral obligation to avoid imposing
serious harms on future persons, refusing to discount is a crude way of
satisfying that obligation. And in some circumstances, it will even
have the perverse effect of imposing additional uncompensated risks
on future people.133
This point is addressed in more detail in a prior work.134 The
basic gist, however, is that future persons benefit from economic
growth. Paying massive amounts for regulatory programs today will
not benefit the future insofar as money spent on those programs can-
not be spent elsewhere-on promoting medical, environmental, and
other safety technologies, say, or on increasing education. These
things benefit both present and future persons, and to the extent dis-
counting reduces investment in projects that promote longterm pros-
perity, it is likely to harm-not help-future people.
The present may well have significant moral obligations to the
future. These moral obligations will be fulfilled neither by discount-
ing nor refusing to discount.135 Determining the extent of these obli-
gations is a massive policy inquiry in its own right, one which this
Article sets aside for another time.136 Whatever these obligations,
however, regulators must match discounting practices to valuation
practices. Failing to do so creates time-indeterminacy, and a funda-
mental mismatch between policy goals and practice.
133 See id.
134 See id. at 198-203.
135 See id. at 198-99.
136 For diverse perspectives, see generally Symposium, Wat Does Our Legal System
Owe Future Generations? New Analyses ofIntergenerationalfustice for a New Century, 77 GEO.
W. L. REV. 1133 (2009) (providing fourteen articles on the topic of intergenerational
justice).
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF TIME-INDETERMINACY IN OTHER CONTEXTS
What are the implications for time-indeterminacy in other con-
texts? A few points spring to mind. First, money has a particular rela-
tionship with time, and as I have argued, we must respect that
relationship if we are to continue to use money as a metric. Wherever
economic cost-benefit analyses inform policy, then, we should be wary
as to the timing of the underlying valuations and awake to the possibil-
ity that one side of the cost-benefit "equation" may be systematically
devalued. Judges applying the Hand Formula, for example, compare
the burden of a precaution to the probability and magnitude of loss if
the precaution is untaken. In performing this analysis, judges ought
to consider the relative timing of the precaution and the potential
loss. To the extent that they monetize the expenditure and loss, they
should apply a monetary discount rate to make the amount of the
possible loss comparable to the cost of the possible precaution.
Judges do not appear to do this, although discounting (and com-
pounding) are used in otherjudicial contexts.137 Because precautions
precede losses, this suggests that time-indeterminate Hand Formula
calculations tend to bias outcomes toward too much liability for
defendants.
Of course, not all legal analyses are economic, and some goods
may have different relationships with time than does money. So long
as there is potential intertemporal variation in the valuation of a good,
however-be that good risk reduction, the preservation of a beautiful
natural landscape, or the extension of a life-time-indeterminacy is
potentially a problem. This would include any context where prefer-
ences inform policy. In such situations, we should be careful to pin
down the timing of preferences.
CONCLUSION
Because regulators treat time-indeterminate studies as if they
actually measure immediate willingness-to-pay, regulatory cost-benefit
analyses are systematically undervaluing regulatory benefits. To the
extent cost-benefit analysis informs regulatory policy, this means that
federal regulations are systematically biased against protecting the
public from risks to health and safety.
Because money has a time-value, time-indeterminate willingness-
to-pay studies do not actually tell us how much people are willing to
137 Most notable, perhaps, is the relatively entrenched practice of adjusting mone-
tary damage awards for the latency period between the time that the damage
occurred and the time of the judgment.
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pay. To eliminate time-indeterminacy in their analyses, regulators
should rely only on willingness-to-pay studies that identify the time at
which regulatory goods are being valued. Regulators should adopt
discounting policies that complement their valuation policies.
Unfortunately, identifying the appropriate time at which to mea-
sure valuations requires a theory of temporal valuation. This Article
has identified two theories that are preferable to current practice. It is
worth debating which approach is best.
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